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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT- STRICT SCRUTINY
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION-RACIAL QUOTAS-The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that student government
regulations of a state university providing for minority representation
on student committees are unconstitutional.
Uzzell v. Friday, 591 F.2d 997 (4th Cir. 1979)
On June 13, 1974, two white male students at the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, a state institution receiving federal
financial assistance, brought suit in a North Carolina federal district
court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the university.
The students alleged that certain university regulations violated rights
guaranteed to them by the fourteenth amendment,' the Civil Rights
Act of 1871,2 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The
challenged regulations provided for the appointment of minority
students to the student governing council, allowed a student charged
with a violation of the Honor Code to have a majority of his judges be
of his own race, and permitted university funding of the Black Student
Movement (BSM).' The district court granted the defendant's motion
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. This statute provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
3. Title VI provides that: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
4. The University of North Carolina student constitution, art. 1, § 1D, provided for
protective representation of minority races and both sexes on the council. If at anytime
there were not at least two minority councillors, two male councillors and two female
councillors, the president of the student body, with the consent of the council made
whatever appointments were necessary to ensure compliance with this section. See Peti-
tioner's Brief for Certiorari at 4, Friday v. Uzzell, 438 U.S. 912 (1978). Art. IV, § E(2)(e)(2)
of the university's constitution provides:
If requested by the defendant, provision shall be made for racial or sexual
representation (but not both) on the trial court, as follows:
a) At least four of the seven members of the trial court shall be of the same sex
as the defendant;
b) When a defendant is not a member of the majority race, at least four of the
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for summary judgment. The court concluded that the propriety of the
university's disbursements to the BSM was moot,' and that no claim or
controversy was presented by the challenges to the validity of the
minority appointment and judge selection procedures.6 The court
determined that since the student government provision allowed for
the appointment of blacks, females, and males to ensure equitable
representation, it would not have an injurious effect on the plaintiffs.'
Similarly, the court held that the application of the honor court provi-
sion was not discriminatory, since it applied to all students.8 The
students appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.
A three-judge court affirmed the district court's ruling that the fund-
ing issue was moot, but reversed the lower court's holding that the
plaintiffs presented no justiciable controversy by their challenge to the
university's minority appointment and judge selection provisions., The
court reversed on the "plain and simple ground"1 that without a show-
ing of either a reasonable basis or a compelling interest, the composi-
tion of the council and the selection of the student honor court judges
were formulated on the basis of race. The court of appeals found that
this "blatantly fouled the letter and spirit of both the Civil Rights Act
and the Fourteenth Amendment"," and remanded with directions that
the district court enter summary judgment for the plaintiffs on both
issues. 2 After a rehearing en banc, in which the decision of the three-
seven members of the trial court shall not be of the majority race;
c) When a defendant is a member of the majority race, at least four of the seven
members of the trial court shall be of the majority race.
591 F.2d 997, 998 n.4 (4th Cir. 1979).
5. On September 18, 1974, the membership policy of the BSM was amended to allow
any student, regardless of race, to be a member if the views of the applicant were consis-
tent with the goals of the BSM. Uzzell v. Friday, 401 F. Supp. 775, 777 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
The university had also indicated to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
that it would terminate funding to any organization with discriminatory membership
policies. Id at 779.
6. Id. at 780-81.
7. The court granted the defendant's motion for two reasons: (1) the provision had
never been used, and (2) the provision was in no way discriminatory toward the plaintiffs.
Id. at 780.
8. Id. at 781.
9. Uzzell v. Friday, 547 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1977).
10. Id. at 804.
11. Id. Summary judgment was ostensibly granted because the university failed to
demonstrate a compelling justification for the challenged provisions. However, in light of
the majority's interpretation of Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), it
may be that the majority was of the opinion that the appellees could never present a com-
pelling justification. See also text accompanying note 22 infra.
12. Uzzell v. Friday, 547 F.2d 801 (4th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 558 F.2d 727 (4th Cir.
1977) (en banc).
Recent Decisions
judge court was affirmed, the United States Supreme Court granted
the university's petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment, and
remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit 8 for further consideration in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke."
On remand, a divided court of appeals again granted summary judg-
ment for the students.' The court held that the remedial measures
were invalid because they impinged upon the rights of others." Fur-
ther, the majority contended that the program's exclusive reliance on
racial criteria violated the strictures of Bakke, which held that benefits
can be neither denied nor conferred to others solely because of race.
The court concluded that the permeating defect in the appointive pro-
vision was the exclusive use of a racial classification which precluded
non-minority students from eligibility for appointment to the council.
Moreover, the presence of unelected members on the student council
diluted the representative character of the student legislative body,
and this disenfranchisement on racial grounds denied equal protection
to the white student body.'8
In examining the justifications put forth by the university for the
racially structured program, the court adhered to Justice Powell's opin-
ion in Bakke which stated that any race conscious measure is subject
to strict scrutiny.' The court then determined that the appointment of
unelected students was not the least restrictive means to ensure
13. Friday v. Uzzell, 438 U.S. 912 (1978).
14. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
15. Uzzell v. Friday, 591 F.2d 997 (4th Cir. 1979).
16. Id. at 1000.
17. Id. at 998.
18. Id.
19. Id In the traditional two-tiered equal protection analysis, fundamental interests
such as voting and the right to travel are subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (residence requirements for voting are subject to strict
scrutiny); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (an individual's right to free in-
terstate passage is fundamental). Additionally, suspect classifications based on race or
alienage have been subjected to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971) (a denial of welfare benefits to aliens was in violation of equal protection);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (statute prohibiting an unmarried interracial
couple from engaging in a meretricious relationship is unconstitutional without a compel-
ling justification). The proponents of the classification bear a heavy burden of justifying
its use by asserting not only a compelling state purpose, but also by showing that the
challenged classification was the least restrictive means to accomplish the stated purpose.
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke deviates from the historical basis of strict scrutiny, in
that he applies strict scrutiny to any race conscious measure, including those classifica-
tions which are designed to benefit classes that have been historically discriminated
against. 438 U.S. at 305. See also text accompanying notes 52 & 53 infra.
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minority representation; therefore, the provision failed to satisfy a
strict scrutiny analysis."
The court then examined the honor court rule that an accused could
request a majority of his judges to be of his own race. The majority
observed that this particular recourse to race was a "preposterous de-
fiance""' of equal protection. The court perceived that the procedure
would neither provide justice nor inspire confidence in the student
judicial process.
The majority concluded that there was no reason to remand to the
district court for a full hearing because a trial was not necessary. They
deduced that Bakke approved racial preferences only if others were
not prejudiced by the remedial action. Since the rights of the white
plaintiffs were impinged upon here, the race conscious student regula-
tions could not be upheld, even if the regulations were an attempt to
eradicate specific past discrimination.'
The dissenters, speaking through Judge Winter,' disagreed both
substantively and procedurally with the majority's disposition of the
case. In contrast to the majority, the dissenters did not read Bakke as
holding that racial quotas may never be the sole determinant in fixing
the rights of students. They denounced, as simplistic, the majority's
proposition that racial preferences could be approved only if others are
not thereby prejudiced.2 The dissenters argued that Bakke approved
the use of racial criteria to redress wrongs worked by adjudicated in-
stances of racial discrimination."
Although the dissenters agreed that all racial classifications were to
be subjected to strict scrutiny, they noted that Justice Powell had also
held that a judicial or legislative finding of past discrimination would
satisfy the compelling justification requirement. Judge Winter concluded
that a just disposition of the issues required a more complete factual
record. Therefore, the dissenters would have remanded the case to the
district court for complete disclosure as to the need for, and the ef-
ficacy of, the present regulations.'
Uzzell v. Friday is the first federal appellate court interpretation of
Bakke to deal with educational affirmative action outside of the univer-
20. 591 F.2d at 999-1000.
21. Id. at 999.
22. Id. at 1000.
23. Chief Judge Haynsworth and Judge Butzner joined in Judge Winter's dissenting
opinion.
24. 591 F.2d at 1000 (Winter, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 1000-01 (Winter, J., dissenting).




sity admission process. The Bakke decision was the first "reverse
discrimination" case decided on the merits,28 and the most significant
race case since Brown v. Board of Education&2 In a four-one-four deci-
sion the Bakke Court ordered Alan Bakke, a white male, admitted to
medical school and declared the University of California's quota system
invalid.' More importantly, however, a majority of the Court upheld
affirmative action in principle and refused to strike down all racial
quotas. Although no single majority spoke for the Court, it has been
suggested that the shifting coalitions of the Bakke Court would
validate the use of racial quotas to cure a specific finding of past
discrimination." If past discrimination is not established, schools may
still use race in conjunction with other factors in determining who is to
be admitted." However, Bakke does prohibit the elevation of race to a
dispositive position in the admission process." The Uzzell court was
tasked with determining how these few resolutions of Bakke were to
be applied in a situation apart from the university admission process.
Unfortunately, the court chose to rely exclusively upon a literal
reading of Bakke rather than to undertake a thorough affirmative ac-
tion analysis.
The real issue before the Uzzell court was whether or not the quota
system was valid, and if so, whether any constitutional limitations
should be placed upon the use of quotas. A second issue was whether a
28. The Supreme Court dismissed as moot the first "reverse discrimination" case.
See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
29. In Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court abrogated the
separate-but-equal doctrine announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
30. Nine Justices authored six separate opinions. Justice Powell held that Alan
Bakke should be admitted because the university's special admission program denied
equal protection to non-minority applicants. 438 U.S. at 319-20. The Chief Justice and
Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and Stevens agreed with the result of Justice Powell's opin-
ion, but based their decision on statutory grounds. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun agreed with
the portion of Powell's opinion holding that a school can constitutionally consider race in
its admission process. Id. at 324-25 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun,
JJ.). The consequence of this four-one-four split was that Powell's opinion, although not
fully shared by any other Justice, spoke for the five-four majorities on each of these
issues.
31. In Seligman, Special Admissions Are Still Special STUDENT LAw., Dec. 1978, at
24, Laurence Tribe is quoted as stating that "the Court might be willing to uphold the
quota approach ... if an appropriate government body had reasonably determined that no
less extreme remedy would adequately offset past discrimination." See also text accompa-
nying notes 60-63 infra.
32. 438 U.S. at 317. See also Abernathy, Affirmative Action and the Rule of Bakke,
64 A.B.A.J. 1233 (1978).
33. 438 U.S. at 317-18.
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racial quota should be subjected to strict or intermediate scrutiny.3
The majority, however, determined that another issue was whether
voluntary remedial racial classifications were per se invalid because
they prejudiced others." After taking a few excerpts out of context
from Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, the majority decided that
voluntary remedial racial classifications were per se invalid and failed
to address the crucial issues presented by the case. '
Notwithstanding the Uzzell court's interpretation of Bakke, and the
superficial appeal of a color-blind view, the Supreme Court has never
announced a per se test in cases involving racial discrimination. 7 Even
in those cases in which invidious classifications that imposed heavy
criminal penalties on minority groups have been invalidated, the Court
has narrowly confined its rulings to the facts of each particular case."
In fact, courts have freely resorted to racial classifications in both
public school desegregation and employment discrimination cases. 9
34. Justice Powell held that strict scrutiny is required whenever any racial classifica-
tion is used. Id at 290-91. See also note 19 supra. The four Justices who joined Justice
Powell in upholding affirmative action called for intermediate scrutiny. The other four
Justices never reached the constitutional issue, and thus made no determination as to the
level of scrutiny required in benign racial classifications. 438 U.S. at 412 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
35. 591 F.2d at 1000.
36. Ironically, Justice Douglas hinted at the possibility that all race classifications
were per se invalid, stating that "[tihe consideration of race as a measure of an applicant's
qualification normally introduces a capricious and irrelevant factor working an invidious
discrimination . . . . 'The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States.'"
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. at 333-34 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967)). But see Motley, From Brown to Bakke, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 315, 325 (1979) (the author states that the opinions of Douglas in other race cases
leave no doubt that Douglas would have joined the opinion of Justice Brennan in Bakke,
thereby putting to rest the affirmative action controversy).
37. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). See also O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher
Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REV. 925 (1974) [hereinafter cited as O'Neill;
Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection Clause: An
Analysis of the Competing Arguments, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 343 (1974).
38. See O'Neil, supra note 37, at 927 & n.8.
39. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (use of
mathematical ratios of white to black students is valid); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of
Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (bidders for federal projects
are required to meet minority hiring goals); Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971) (seniority lists for the selection of principals can be
suspended to increase the number of blacks in supervisory positions). The constitutional
aspects of affirmative action have been cogently described as follows:
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious. To avoid conflict with the
equal protection clause, a classification that denies a benefit, causes harm or im-
Vol. 18:185
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Most recently, the Court in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey'" re-
jected a per se rule against the voluntary use of racial criteria in an
apportionment context. Moreover, the most recent pronouncement in
Bakke is that affirmative action is constitutionally permissible, provided
that the racial measures pass the appropriate scrutiny.' 1
The Uzzell court, both majority and dissent, may also be faulted for
accepting Justice Powell's view that all racial classification must pass a
strict scrutiny analysis. Justice Powell alone decided that state educa-
tional programs which disadvantaged white students should be held to
the same strict scrutiny as programs which disadvantaged black
students.'" The Stevens faction, who joined with Justice Powell to
order Alan Bakke admitted, did not find it necessary to reach the con-
stitutional issue, and thus, gave no indication in Bakke as to their
views on the appropriate scrutiny.'" However, each member of the
Stevens faction has approved some form of affirmative action at an
earlier time," and in one instance intermediate scrutiny was used.'3
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun applied only in-
termediate scrutiny to the quota system at issue in Bakke." This level
of scrutiny was used to determine if the program stigmatized non-
whites or burdened other minorities.'7 The Uzzell court, armed with
judicious commentary on the type of scrutiny appropriate for benign
classifications,'8 should have at least considered the applicability of in-
termediate scrutiny.
poses a burden must not be based on race. In that sense the Constitution is color
blind. But the Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being
perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir.), aff'd on
rehearing, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1966) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Caddo Parish
School Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
40. 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (upholding a race conscious redistricting plan designed to
guarantee non-white voters a viable majority).
41. See note 34 and accompanying text supra
42. 438 U.S. at 287-91. See Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Pro-
cedural Fairness, or Structural Justice?, 92 HARV. L. REV. 864, 865 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Tribe].
43. See note 30 supra.
44. See Tribe, supra note 42, at 865 n.4.
45. In Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam) the Court employed in-
termediate scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of a social security retirement
benefit program which provided higher payments to women than to men with equal past
earnings. The Court upheld the validity of the gender-based classification, finding that it
was designed to compensate women for past economic disabilities they had suffered. Id. at
320. See also The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 177 (1977).
46. 438 U.S. at 357-58 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
47. Id. at 358-60. See also Tribe, supra note 42, at 865.
48. See Dworkin, The Bakke Decision, Did It Decide Anything, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
Aug. 17, 1978, at 29 [hereinafter cited as Dworkin]; Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse
1979
Duquesne Law Review
The Bakke Court's split on the scrutiny issue is traceable to a fun-
damental disagreement about whether or not there can be a 'benign'
racial classification. Justice Powell opined that discrimination could
never be benign, since in pluralistic society, there is no principled
basis for assessing which faction deserves heightened judicial scrutiny. 9
Although Justice Brennan disagreed with Justice Powell's statement
of principle, he conceded that the mere recitation of a benign purpose
would not preclude judicial inquiry into the actual underlying pur-
poses. Justice Brennan believed that the Davis program, having met
four requirements, should be subject only to intermediate scrutiny.5M
Although Justice Powell's color-blind rationale has merit, his view of
strict scrutiny in Bakke is inconsistent not only with his earlier opin-
ions on the subject,51 but also with the historical basis for strict
scrutiny. From its inception, the rationale for strict scrutiny has been
to protect "insular and discrete minorities"5 from unfair majoritarian
measures. Not until Bakke was it thought that strict scrutiny was
necessary to protect the majority from itself. Yet under Justice
Powell's view, if the majority "discriminates" against itself, the self-
imposed burden is constitutionally suspect." This ignores the obvious
fact that no burden is cast upon a group powerless to reject it by the
political process. Justice Powell's view that strict scrutiny applies to
all racial classifications stifles not only the undesirable expressions of
majority rule, but all expressions of majority rule.
Justice Powell's Bakke opinion is also incompatible with his earlier
opinions which relied upon the traditional indicia of suspectness." In
Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ely] (for the proposition
that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate). But see Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal
World Equality for the Negro, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966) (for the proposition that strict
scrutiny is appropriate).
49. 438 U.S. at 295-96. See also Kurland, Bakke's Wake, CH. B. REC., Sept. 19, 1978,
at 80.
50. 438 U.S. at 357-58 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). The
four tests were that no fundamental right be involved, that the disadvantaged class not
have the traditional indices of suspectness so as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian process, that race be relevant to the goal sought, and that the
classification neither be based on a presumption of racial inferiority, nor promote racial
hatred or separatism. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 90 (1979 Supp.).
51. See note 55 and accompanying text infra.
52. In Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the Court announced
for the first time that legislation would be more carefully scrutinized if it affected discrete
and insular minorities. Id. at 152 n.4.
53. See Ely, supra note 48, at 727.
54. See Tribe, supra note 42, at 865, where the author suggests that strict scrutiny is
inapplicable unless the classification stigmatizes a group with a stamp of inferiority or




San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez," Justice Powell
stated that distinctions based upon wealth created no suspect class
since the poor taxpayers were neither historically saddled with
disabilities nor politically powerless." Therefore, strict scrutiny was in-
appropriate in reviewing such a large and amorphous class united only
by the common factor of residence. This reluctance to protect a large
and amorphous class disappears in Bakke, where protection is given to
a member of the majority. To accomplish this paradoxical result,
Justice Powell did not state what he considered to be the single unify-
ing factor of the majority class. Had he done so, the only plausible
answer would be their will.
By applying strict scrutiny, the Uzzell court suggested that benign
racial classifications are equivalent to invidious discrimination. This
suggestion implies that benign classifications result in such destructive
effects that they can be justified only if a compelling need for remedial
action is shown. Unfortunately, the result of this implication is that
many remedial race-conscious efforts could be unnecessarily thwarted
if required to pass a strict scrutiny analysis.
The second issue which the Uzzell court inadequately addressed was
the validity of racial quotas. The legitimacy of the popularly mandated
racial quota at issue in Uzzell should not have been summarily de-
nounced by the majority. In Bakke only Justice Powell held that the
University of California's quota system was invalid."7 He was offended
by a system in which a member of a non-preferred group was com-
pletely foreclosed from being considered along with members of the
preferred group." Thus, Justice Powell approved the use of race in the
admission process only if done in a subtle manner."
.Although Justice Powell's approach has the salutory effect of de-
emphasizing race, the superiority of a flexible program cannot justify a
55. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
56. Id. at 28. In refusing to apply strict scrutiny, Powell stated:
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the tradi-
tional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or sub-
jected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian process.
Id.
57. 438 U.S. at 297-99.
58. Id. at 319 n.53.
59. Id. at 317-18. For a discussion of how admission committees could easily evade
Powell's no-quota principle, see Karst & Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and the Equal




constitutional distinction.' Quota systems and the use of race as a plus
factor are only different methods of achieving the same goal."' A con-
stitutional distinction between the two methods is only valid if a quota
impinges upon the rights of white students as individuals in some way
that the more flexible programs do not."2 In reality, both methods af-
fect the white participant the same way since his overall chances of be-
ing selected for the benefit are reduced." This is especially true under
Justice Powell's formulation that race can be a factor in promoting
diversity, since to so use it requires identifying groups of people shar-
ing certain characteristics which separate them from other groups."
The weight of the racial "factor" will depend upon the number of other
applicants possessing a similar characteristic. 5 Thus, once a university
commits itself to diversity, the individual is invariably considered in
light of his relation to the group. At best, this is a subliminal quota,
but a quota nonetheless.
Fashioning a valid affirmative action remedy is both a constitutional
and practical problem, and the validity of a remedy once it is fashioned
requires a full factual inquiry. The parties to the Uzzell case, in which
summary judgment was granted in four hearings, were never given
this opportunity. Although it is difficult to derive much meaning from
Bakke's message in the area of expanding equal protection," the Uzzell
court was incorrect in suggesting that Bakke held that voluntary race
classifications which impinge upon the rights of others are per se in-
valid. The court should have recognized that any effect which the
university's quota system may have created would not constitute in-
vidious discrimination, and, therefore, that strict scrutiny was not war-
ranted. As one commentator has suggested, "[ijf racial quotas are to be
condemned, it should be because they will not work to achieve the
desired result. It should not be because they seek either to perpetuate
60. See Dworkin, supra note 48, at 27.
61. Id. at 27-28.
62. Id.
63. Id. See also Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT.- REV. 1, 9. The author states that although
race may be irrelevant to the education process, it is a convenient proxy for attributes
that are relevant. Id.
64. Although the theme of "individual consideration" was of prime importance to
Powell's determination that quotas were invalid, this requirement is of secondary concern
in his diversity concept. See Karst & Horowitz, supra note 59, at 17-19.
65. Id
66. See Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Forwar& Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977) (suggesting that the equal pro-
tection doctrine is now at the point of maximum incoherence).
Vol. 18:185
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an unjust society or to realize a corrupt ideal.""1 The majority decision
in Uzzell represents a lamentable judicial insensitivity to the difficult
task of structuring a viable affirmative action program.
Christine Vento
67. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the
Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581, 616 (1977).
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